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Decisions in Criminal, Election, Contracts, Administrative & Corporate Law Matters

By FindLaw Staff on August 25, 2010 | Last updated on March 21, 2019

Worldmark, The Club v. Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp., C061019, concerned a challenge to the trial court's denial of a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation's petition to set aside a member's section 8330 demand on the ground that it had satisfied its statutory obligations in proposing an alternative.  In affirming the judgment with modification, the court held that the information the member seeks, including email addresses, shall be made available to him in electronic form at his option and no further written demand is necessary.  Also, if any member's address is not in electronic form, the corporation shall provide a written copy of such address to the member.  Lastly, the court held that the member or his appointed representative must acknowledge in writing his agreement not to use or allow use of the membership information for commercial or other purposes not reasonably related to the affairs of the corporation.

 

Schram Constr., Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, A125808, concerned a challenge to the trial court's denial of plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate challenging a decision by a general contractor and University Regents, awarding a contract to another subcontractor.  In reversing, the court held that the contract with the subcontractor must be set aside, as the University's violations of the competitive bidding statutes were not merely "technical or nonsubstantive," and they undermined the goal of stimulating competition in a manner conducive to sound fiscal practices and compromised the integrity of the selection process by failing to ensure procedural and substantive fairness. The court also held that the University did not violate section 1056.7 in awarding a contract on one of the alternative combination packages to the subcontractor.

People v. Jeha, C061980, concerned a challenge to the trial court's order of mandatory lifetime sex offender registration, in a conviction of defendant for sexual penetration by foreign object on an unconscious person.  In affirming, the court held that the forcible nature of defendant's sex offense sets him apart from the defendants in Hofsheier and following cases in which an equal protection challenge to section 290 was sustained.  Further, defendant's substantive due process rights under the federal and state constitutions are not violated by section 290's requirement that he register as a sex offender.

People v. Butler, D054120, concerned a challenge to a conviction of defendant for involuntary manslaughter, arising from an incident in which defendant and other individuals beat, tied up, suffocated and provided cocaine to the victim.  In affirming the conviction, the court held that the defendant's numerous challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's causation finding is rejected as the evidence supports the conclusion that defendant committed acts that substantially and foreseeably contributed to the victim's death.  The court also held that the trial court's jury instructions adequately informed the jury of the criminal negligence standard applicable to the mens rea required for involuntary manslaughter, and there was no instructional error.

Arntz v. Superior Court, A129173, concerned a challenge to the trial court's grant of a city supervisor's petition for declaratory relief that S.F. Charter section 2.101 did not prohibit her from standing for election to another four-year term as supervisor, and a writ of mandate directing the director of elections to accept the supervisor's filings and to print her name as a candidate on the November 2, 2010 ballot.  The court held that the judgment was an error as, when an appointed supervisor has served three years of one term, and then been elected and served four years of another term, the rounding up language of section 2.101 is operative and prohibits the supervisor being a candidate for another four-year term.  Therefore, because the trial court ruled that the supervisor could run again, the court of appeals orders the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate upholding the decision of election officials refusing to put the supervisor's name on the ballot.

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